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TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY: ALASKAN NATIVE EXERCISE
OF SOVEREIGN POWERS
David Blurton
As a result of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act,' Alaskan
natives have undisputed title to several million acres of land.
However, the recognition of tribal sovereignty which has been ac-
corded to the Indians of the contiguous United States has not
been readily accorded the Alaskan natives. The term "Alaskan
native" includes Indians, Aleuts, and Eskimos, all of whom are
treated similarly by the federal government. This note will examine
the requirements an Alaskan native organization must meet to
be recognized as possessing tribal sovereignty and the benefits that
accompany such recognition. This paper will also explore the use
of the Indian Reorganization Act 2 as a tool for meeting those
requirements.
Tribal Sovereignty
Tribal sovereignty has two general attributes: the tribe and its
members may be protected from the assertion of state authority,
and the tribe may exercise certain regulatory powers. The United
States Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that Indian tribes
possess a "semi-independent position" with the power to regulate
their internal and social affairs.' This "semi-independent position"
and Congress' authority to regulate Indians under the Indian com-
merce clause,4 raised two independent barriers to state regulation
of tribal reservations and members.' State authority may be
preempted by federal law or restricted if it infringes on the right
of reservation Indians to make and enforce their own laws.'
Tribal Exercise of Sovereign Powers
A tribe may exercise its sovereign powers over tribal members
and territory to the extent that such powers have not been with-
1. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1628 (1982).
2. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1982).
3. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980); McClanahan
v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 173 (1973); United States v. Kagama, 118
U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886).
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
5. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 448 U.S. at 142.
6. Id.
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drawn by treaty, federal statutes, or by implication as a necessary
result of their independent status.7 It may be inferred from the
holding in Settler v. Lameer that a tribe's regulatory authority
over its members is generally limited to the members' activities
within the tribe's territory.' In Settler, a tribe's authority to regulate
off-reservation fishing by tribal members was upheld, but only
because a treaty reserved the tribe's right to regulate the fishing
by tribal members at the tribe's "usual and accustomed" off-
reservation fishing places. 9 This implies that a tribe has no authority
to regulate a member's activities outside the tribe's territory unless
the federal government has specifically recognized that authority.
Nevertheless, the tribe's sovereign immunity from suit does ex-
tend tribal sovereignty beyond the tribe's territory. For example,
the Alaska Supreme Court has held that recognition of a tribe's
tribal status by the federal government is the sole condition prece-
dent to judicial recognition of a tribe's sovereign immunity.'I Thus,
recognition of a tribe's sovereign immunity is not dependent on
location of the tribe's activity.
Limitations on Alaska's Regulation of Natives
Absent express federal law to the contrary, Indian actions outside
their reservation's boundaries are generally subject to nondiscrim-
inatory state laws." Because the Annette Island Reservation is
the only Indian reservation remaining in Alaska,' 2 Alaskan natives
must rely upon federal law to exempt them from state regulation.
The Alaska Statehood Act imposes some restraints upon the
state's regulation of Indians.' 3 Section 4 of the Act provides that
land or other property owned by natives or held in trust for them
by the United States shall be under the "absolute jurisdiction"
of the United States, except to the extent that Congress provides
otherwise. The meaning of this provision was the primary focus
of the United States Supreme Court in two companion cases,
7. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
8. 507 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1974).
9. Id. at 236.
10. Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 P.2d 151, 161 (Alaska 1977).
11. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1972).
12. All Indian reservations in Alaska except for the Annette Islands Reservation were
revoked by the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1618 (1982).
13. Act of July 7, 1958, Pub. L. 85-508, § 4, 72 Stat. 339 (codified as amended
at 48 U.S.C. § 21 (1982)).
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Organized Village of Kake v. Egan and Metlakatla Indian Com-
munity, Annette Islands Reserve v. Egan. 4 These cases involved
the applicability of Alaska's regulation banning the use of fish
traps to the native villages which had received permits to operate
fish traps from the Secretary of the Interior. In the Kake deci-
sion, the Court held that "absolute jurisdiction" did not mean
exclusive jurisdiction, and that the state regulation banning the
use of fish traps was applicable to the Kake village.' 5 In contrast,
in Metlakatla, the Court held that the state regulation was preemp-
ted by the Secretary of the Interior's action granting the Metlakatla
village a permit to operate a fish trap.' 6 These two cases are facially
distinguishable on the grounds that Metlakatla involved native ac-
tivities on a reservation, while Kake did not. However, these two
cases are distinguishable on a more critical factor. In Kake, the
Court held that the Secretary of the Interior did not have the
authority to grant the village a fish trap permit,' 7 while in
Metlakatla, the Secretary of the Interior did have such authority
as a result of the statute that created the village's reservation.'"
The rule of these cases, then, is that authorized federal action
may preempt state regulation of related native property rights.
Section 4 of the Alaska Statehood Act also provides that, unless
Congress prescribes otherwise, state taxation will not be imposed
on any lands or other property owned by natives or held in trust
for natives by the United States,' 9 except for lands or other prop-
erty held by individual natives in fee without restrictions on aliena-
tion. It seems apparent from the plain language of the Act that
property rights owned by native organizations in fee without restric-
tions on alienation are exempt from state taxation unless specifically
authorized by Congress. However, in Board of Equalization for
the Borough of Ketchikan v. Alaska Native Brotherhood &
Sisterhood, Camp No. 14, the Alaska Supreme Court held that
a native organization was subject to a local ad valorum tax.2" The
court focused on the tax exemption provisions of the Indian
14. Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962); Metlakatla Indian Com-
munity, Annette Islands Reserve v. Egan, 369 U.S. 45 (1962).
15. Kake, 369 U.S. at 71.
16. Metlakatla, 369 U.S. at 59.
17. Kake, 369 U.S. at 62.
18. Metlakatla, 369 U.S. at 59.
19. 43 U.S.C. § 1618 (1982).
20. 666 P.2d 1015, 1022 (Alaska 1983).
1984] NOTES
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Reorganization Act (IRA), rather than the Alaska Statehood Act,
and held that the tax-exempt status of property not held in trust
by the United States depends upon whether the state taxation in-
fringes on the natives' right to make and enforce their own rules.2"
Furthermore, the court held that the federal government's and
the natives' interests must be weighed against the state's interests."
Interestingly, the Alaska Supreme Court has applied case law,
previously used only with taxation issues arising on reservations,
to the taxation of native-held property rights not involving a trust
relationship with the United States. Although this extends the tradi-
tional recognition of native sovereign rights, it falls short of the
plain language requirements of the Alaska Statehood Act. In
Alaska Native Brotherhood, the court failed to find congressional
authorization of state taxation of property held by an Alaskan
native organization, and yet it upheld such taxation.2"
As recognized by the Alaska Supreme Court in Alaska Native
Brotherhood,2 4 the IRA prohibits the state and local taxation of
land or the rights associated with the land held in trust by the
United States for Indians." This provision was specifically made
applicable to Alaskan natives.26 The United States Supreme Court
limited the scope of this tax exemption to exclude the taxation
of income derived from such lands located outside of a reserva-
tion.27 Consequently, the IRA serves only as a bar to state or
local property taxes on IRA trust property.
Provisions concerning state and local taxation of native prop-
erty are also contained in the Alaska Native Claims Settlement
Act. 21 Revenues originating from the Alaska Native Fund and
received by a regional corporation, village corporation, or in-
dividual Alaskan native are not subject to any form of federal,
state, or local taxation.2 ' Real property interests conveyed to in-
dividual natives, regional corporations, village corporations, or
corporations established pursuant to section 1613(h)(3) of the Act
21. Id. at 1021.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1018.
25. 25 U.S.C. § 465 (1982).
26. Id. § 473.
27. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 411 U.S. at 157.
28. 43 U.S.C. § 1620(a) (1982).
29. Id. However, this exemption does not apply to income derived from investment




are exempt from state or local property taxes for a period of twenty
years from the vesting of the title.30 However, the tax-exempt status
will not apply to such real property interests if the land is developed
or leased to third parties for other than exploration purposes."
The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act addresses another state
jurisdiction aspect, authorizing Alaska's intestacy laws to apply
to intestate shareholders of stock in regional and village corpora-
tions.32 The Alaska Supreme Court has noted that 28 U.S.C. §
1360 bars state jurisdiction over cases involving regional corpora-
tion stock unless a federal statute specifically grants the state such
authority.33 The court found such authority in the Claims Act,
and applied Alaska intestacy law.3 Arguably, native custom or
law could be applied to intestate issues under the Act because,
although the Act provides for state jurisdiction to litigate the issue,
it does not specify a choice of law. However, whether state or
native intestacy law should be applied is probably academic because
the Alaska Supreme Court has adopted the doctrine of equitable
or virtual adoption, which appears to apply native customs and
laws to the intestacy issue. 5
Finally, Public Law 280 gives Alaska exclusive criminal jurisdic-
tion over all Indian country within Alaska, 36 except the Metlakatla
30. 43 U.S.C. § 1620(d) (1982).
31. Id.
32. Id. § 1606(h)(2).
33. Calista Corp. v. Mann, 564 P.2d 53, 57-58 (Alaska 1977). In this case, two women
were adopted by native shareholders in a regional corporation formed under the authority
of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. The adoptions were valid under the tradi-
tional cultures in which the parties lived, but were not statutory adoptions under Alaska
law. Upon the death of the shareholder, the daughters requested the corporation shares
through intestate succession from the corporation, but were refused. The district court
found that they were appropriately adopted.
34. Id. at 58-59. The court said:
Section 7(h)(2) of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1606(h)(2),
directs that upon the death of a stockholder, ownership in his stock shall be trans-
ferred in accordance with his last will and testament or "under applicable laws of
intestacy." We conclude that this language, which requires disposition of property
in accord with state laws, also grants to the state courts the powers to interpret those
laws. Further, we conclude that this interpretation is not violative of 28 U.S.C. §
1360(b)'s limitation on the power of state courts in probate proceedings to adjudicate
rights in affected Indian properties.
35. Id. at 61-62. The court set out five criteria that must be met before it will apply
the doctrine of equitable adoption and requires proof to meet the standard of clear and
convincing evidence.
36. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, §§ 1-4, 6, 7, 67 Stat. 588 (1953),
as amended (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 and 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1982)).
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Indian community of the Annette Islands Reservation, which may
exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed on the reservation by
Indians." Similarly, Public Law 280 gives Alaska "jurisdiction
over civil causes of action between Indians or to which Indians
are parties which arise in... Indian country." 38 The statute
specifically excepts jurisdiction from the state in adjudicating In-
dian ownership or possession of property held in trust by the United
States or subject to restrictions against alienation. 9 The Alaska
Supreme Court has held that this restriction prevents the state
courts from taking juiisdiction over issues involving tribal member-
ship if a determination of tribal membership affects a tribal
member's rights with regard to trust or restricted property."0 Fur-
thermore, the United States Supreme Court has noted that the
legislative history of Public Law 280 reveals no intention of con-
ferring general regulatory control over Indian country upon the
state." Rather, the intent in granting civil jurisdiction was to pro-
vide an adequate forum and laws for resolving private legal disputes
to which an Indian was a party. While Public Law 280 confers
exclusive criminal jurisdiction upon the state of Alaska, it does
not contain any terms implying exclusive state civil jurisdiction.
Instead, the statute provides for the application of tribal ordinances
or customs when not inconsistent with state law.4 2 Thus tribal civil
ordinances and customs may be used as a choice of law in the
state courts and, arguably, there is nothing in the statute pro-
hibiting the establishment of tribal courts in Alaska with the
jurisdiction to hear civil causes of action arising in Indian country
and involving natives as parties.
Indian country is not defined in Public Law 280. However, 18
U.S.C. § 1151 defines "Indian country" for criminal jurisdiction
to include (a) "all land within the limits of any Indian reserva-
tion," .(b) "all dependent Indian communities," and (c) all Indian
allotments [to which] Indian title... has not been extinguished." ' 43
There is nothing in the legislative history of the Alaska amendment
to Public Law 280 that directly indicates Congress' intended mean-
37. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) and (c) (1982).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (1982).
39. Id. § 1360(b).
40. Ollestead v. Native Village of Tyonek, 560 P.2d 31 , 34 (Alaska 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 938 (1977).
41. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 383-84 (1976).
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(c) (1982).




ing of "Indian country" with respect to civil jurisdiction, but the
meaning can be inferred from the context to have the same meaning
in both civil and criminal jurisdictional contexts. The legislative
history begins by referring to 18 U.S.C. § 1151 in connection with
criminal jurisdiction, then addresses civil jurisdiction without any
indication that "Indian country" is being used differently, and
finally uses "Indian country" in reference to both civil and criminal
jurisdiction." The Supreme Court has similarly concluded that
the criminal jurisdiction definition of "Indian country" applies
to the civil context as well."'
Indian Country
The determination of what is Indian country is important in
setting tribal and state jurisdictional boundaries. Of the three
categories of land that constitute Indian country, the dependent
Indian community category is of the most significance to Alaskan
natives. This is because Alaska has only one Indian reservation,
and the aggregate size of allotted lands in Alaska is small com-
pared to the lands received by Alaskan natives under the Alaska
Native Claims Settlement Act that may have some potential for
being classified as dependent Indian communities.
The Supreme Court addressed the determination of the depen-
dent Indian community status in United States v. McGowan, a
case involving the transportation of alcoholic beverages in Indian
country." The Court stated that the particular land in question
had been validly set apart for the Indians and noted that since
the government had retained title to the land it permitted the In-
dians to occupy, it had authority to enact regulations and protec-
tive laws respecting this territory. "7 Similarly, in United States v.
Martine,"' the Tenth Circuit determined that land outside the reser-
vation, purchased with tribal funds, was a dependent Indian com-
munity. The court stated that the manner in which the land had
been treated by the federal legislature and executive agencies was
central to the determination, and that four factors were to be con-
sidered: (1) the nature of the area in question; (2) the relationship
44. S. REP. No. 1872, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 3347, 3348.
45. DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975).
46. United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535 (1938).
47. Id. at 539.
48. United States v. Martine, 442 F.2d 1022, 1023 (10th Cir. 1971).
1984]
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of the inhabitants of the area to Indian tribes; (3) the relationship
of the inhabitants to the federal government; and (4) the established
practice of government agencies toward the area.49 In United States
v. South Dakota,0 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals considered
the factors applied in McGowan and Martine, along with whether
the inhabitants manifested an element of cohesiveness in their com-
mon economic pursuits, interests, or needs. The court held that
a city housing project operated by a tribal housing authority was
a dependent Indian community." Facts pertinent to the determina-
tion were that the tribe provided many social services to the housing
project, some in cooperation the Bureau of Indian Affairs and
the Department of Health and Human Services' Indian Health
Service, and that the tribe contributed equipment and facilities
to the city to help in providing municipal services to the housing
project.2
Alaska has been reluctant to recognize areas as being depen-
dent Indian communities. Early in Alaska's territorial history, the
nonrecognition of Indian country became an established practice.
In In re Sah Quah, a territorial court considered the federal statute
that extended the laws of the United States to the Territory of
Alaska in conjunction with the statute that dealt with liquor traf-
ficking in Alaska's Indian country. It concluded that Alaska was
Indian country only for the purpose of liquor trafficking laws."
No Alaskan court recognized the presence of Indian country un-
til 1957, when an Alaska federal district court held that an Indian
village was Indian country in the case of In re McCord.5 4 That
court stated two requirements for an area to be Indian country:
(1) the area must be set apart from the public domain and dedicated
to the use of Indians, and (2) an operational tribal organization
must be present within the area." In apparent conflict with this
decision, another Alaska federal district court subsequently held
that the Annette Islands Indian Reservation was not Indian
country.5 6 In reaching its decision the court applied the two-part
49. Id.
50. United States v. South Dakota, 665 F.2d 837, 839 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 823 (1982).
51. Id. at 843.
52. Id. at 839-41.
53. In re Sah Quah, 31 F. 327, 328 (1886).
54. 151 F. Supp. 132 (D. Alaska 1957).
55. Id. at 135.




test stated in McCord, but held that despite the presence of a
mayor and village council, the reservation did not have an opera-
tional tribal government. The court thought that the absence of
a chief or medicine man precluded the government from being
a tribal government." Thus, although the two-part test stated in
McCord was not disputed, this particular district court was reluc-
tant to depart from the long-entrenched practice of not recogniz-
ing Indian country in Alaska.
McCord represented a drastic change in judicial recognition of
Indian country in Alaska and prompted Congress to extend the
mandatory provisions of Public Law 280 to Alaska. The Senate
report on the bill referred to the long-established practice of not
recognizing Indian country in Alaska, and then stated that under
the McCord holding there were many native villages that would
qualify for Indian country status." Implicit in Congress' exten-
sion of Public Law 280 to Alaska is the recognition of the McCord
holding as being valid. If Congress had thought that the holding
was incorrect, it could have simply declared that none of Alaska
would be considered Indian country.
Recognition of Tribes
It is implicit in the McCord test for Indian country that a
recognized tribe be associated with the land. The Supreme Court
has stated that if a group of Indians is distinctly an Indian com-
munity, then it is for Congress to determine to what extent the
group will be recognized as a dependent tribe. 9 However, the
Supreme Court has also held that Congress cannot arbitrarily label
a group of people a tribe.6" In Montoya v. United States,6' the
Court stated four elements necessary for a group to be a tribe:
the members must be "of the same or similar race," united in
a community, under one leadership or government, and inhabit
a particular territory.62 The First Circuit Court of Appeals has
elaborated on these elements in Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury
Corp. 3 The government element merely required that the alleged
57. Id. at 274.
58. S. REP. No. 1872, supra note 44, at 3348-49.
59. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913).
60. United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 439 (1926).
61. 180 U.S. 261 (1901).
62. Id. at 266.
63. 582 F.2d 575 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 866 (1979).
1984]
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leaders be role models with whom a majority of the alleged tribe
consulted and followed on questions of tribal significance, and
that the leadership be continuous and not sporadic. 4 Arguably,
this standard of "government" as an element for determining a
tribe is also applicable in the "operational tribal government"
requirement of McCord. Furthermore, since recognition of tribal
status by Congress presupposes that the group is distinctly native,
congressional or executive recognition of an Alaskan native village
should satisfy the McCord operational tribal government require-
ment for Indian country.
Tribal Sovereignty and the Indian Reorganization Act
Generally, courts seem more prone to recognize tribal sovereignty
when it is associated with lands held in trust for the tribe or native
village. With the advent of the Indian Self-Determination Act,"5
placing lands in trust should not diminish the natives' control of
the lands to as great an extent as it would have under policies
prevalent before the Act. Section 465 of the IRA provides a means
by which Alaskan natives may convert lands received pursuant
to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act into trust lands. This
section provides that the Secretary of the Interior may acquire
lands to be held in trust for Indians, and such lands are exempt
from state and local taxation. 6 Lands not held in trust receive
no exemption, even if the federal government is involved with
the tribe's use of the lands and has contributed funds. 7 Nor does
the tax exemption apply to income derived from the property."
An Alaska district court held that a tribal government has sovereign
immunity solely on the ground that the tribe has an IRA-organized
government.69 Consequently, the use of the IRA may be beneficial
to Alaskan natives in their quest to have their sovereign powers
recognized.
A case decided in the Washington, D.C. District Court is rele-
vant to the Alaskan natives' use of the IRA to acquire trust lands.
64. Id. at 584-85.
65. 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n, 455-458e; 42 U.S.C. §§ 476, 2004b; 50 U.S.C. § 456,
and 5 U.S.C. § 3371 (1982).
66. 25 U.S.C. § 465 (1982).
67. Alaska Native Bhd. & Sisterhood, Camp No. 14, 666 P.2d 1018-29 (Alaska 1983).
68. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 411 U.S. at 155-57.
69. Parker Drilling Co. v. Metlakatla Indian Community, 451 F. Supp. 1127, 1131
(D. Alaska 1978). Here the government was organized pursuant to the Indian Reorganiza-




In City of Sault Ste. Marie v. Andrus," the court held that the
Secretary of the Interior had acted properly in acquiring land within
the city to hold in trust for the tribe. The exercise of the Secretary's
discretion in acquiring the lands was not contingent upon the
beneficiary Indians being landless; nor did it matter that the tribe
purchased the land and then donated it to the Secretary to be
held in trust for the tribe.7' In fact, the court concluded that the
Secretary's action was "entirely consistent with the letter and [the]
spirit of the statute."7 " The court also held that, although a tribe
must be recognized to qualify for treatment under the IRA, it
needs only to have been recognizable, not actually recognized,
in 1934. Thus tribes or native villages in Alaska that can qualify
for IRA treatment may be able to take lands they already own
and transfer the lands to the Secretary of the Interior to be held
in trust for the tribe or village. Such actions should not be barred
by the lands being within an existing town, nor by the native
organization owning other land.
The use of the IRA to convert lands received pursuant to the
Claims Settlement Act to trust status may be barred by this Act
for two reasons. First, section 1601 of the Act declares that the
Act's intent was neither to create a lengthy trusteeship nor to create
any additional categories of property with tax-exempt status. 71 It
is certainly arguable that it is contrary to the express intent of
the Act for such lands to be converted to trust lands, and that
it is beyond the Secretary's discretion to acquire and hold such
lands in trust for Alaskan natives. Even if it is not beyond the
Secretary's discretion, the Secretary may consider the intent clause
of the Act as a deciding factor in choosing not to acquire the
land in trust for the natives.
Sections 1611 and 1613(c) of the Act may also operate as a
bar to the use of the IRA to place these lands in a trust status.
Section 1611 provides that title to such lands is to be initially held
by village and regional corporations created under the Act." The
lands selected by the village corporations were required to include
the townships in which the village is located.ls Section 1613(c)
70. 532 F. Supp. 157 (D.D.C. 1980).
71. Id. at 162.
72. Id.
73. 43 U.S.C. § 1601(b) (1982).
74. Id. § 1611(a)(1).
75. Id.
1984]
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requires the village corporation, upon receipt of the land patents,
to transfer title of tracts, in order of priority, to native and non-
native occupants of such tracts, to nonprofit organizations that
are occupants of such tracts, and, finally, the remaining improved
tracts upon which the village is located to municipal corporations
established within the native village. 71 If a municipal corporation
is not established in the village, then the remaining improved land
upon which the village is located is to be conveyed to the state
to be held in trust for any such municipal corporation to be
established in the future." Section 1613(c) places title to land,
central to village locations, in the name of state-incorporated
municipalities. Consequently, if these particular lands are to be
conveyed to the Secretary of the Interior to be held in trust for
the tribe or native village, Alaska's state statutes will have to be
considered with regard to the permissibility of the incorporated
municipality's actions.
Conclusion
The concept of Indian country is important with regard to the
exercise of Alaskan natives' sovereign rights. While the status of
Indian country may not prevent the incursion of state jurisdic-
tion, the status does define the geographical extent over which
a native organization may exercise its sovereign powers, including
its regulatory powers. Essential for recognition as Indian country
is the existence of a functioning native government and land that
has been set aside for the use of the natives. The courts have a
greater tendency to recognize the Indian country status of an area
if the land is held in trust for the natives. Thus it may be useful
for the natives to attempt to use the IRA to place their lands in
a trust status. Because the determination of Indian country status
is dependent upon the establishment and federal recognition of
a native government, such governments should attempt to use
federal programs that are designed to encourage their develop-
ment. Programs developed under the Indian Self-Determination
Act might be considered as a means to expand native government
services to the natives and at the same time establish sufficient
federal government involvement to meet the requirements for
recognizing the village as Indian country.
76. Id. § 1613(c)(1).




For protection from incursions of state jurisdiction, the natives
must rely upon preemption of the state's jurisdiction by federal
statutes. Section 4 of the Alaska Statehood Act may provide the
greatest protection. In relying upon the Act, natives should em-
phasize authorized federal agencies' actions which may preempt
state regulation of certain native activities. Consequently, it may
be desirable for the native governments to involve the federal
government in their activities by utilizing programs developed under
the Indian Self-Determination Act.
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https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol12/iss2/5
